484,000 open buckets: what the 2026 Cloud Exposure Index means for small AWS teams
In October 2026, researchers counted 484,142 cloud storage buckets that anyone on the internet could list. Together they held about 18 billion files, including more than 320,000 credential and key files. Most of those buckets were on Amazon S3.
That is not because S3 is less secure. It is because S3 is the most widely used, and because one setting, left off, is all it takes.
What the research found
The Ransomnews Cloud Exposure Index, first reported by Security Affairs on 29 October 2026, did not open any files. It used search engines that index open cloud storage, and counted buckets, file types and modification dates. The headline figures:
- 484,142 publicly listable buckets, of which 347,984 (71.9%) were on Amazon S3.
- 80,495
.envfiles, the kind that hold database passwords and API keys. Two-thirds were last modified in 2026, so these are live projects, not forgotten archives. - 475 Terraform state files, which often contain every secret an environment uses.
- 10,891 buckets with names linked to regulated sectors such as finance, healthcare and HR.
The authors are careful to say that many public buckets are public on purpose, and that a bucket name does not prove who owns it. But their most important point is simple: closing a bucket does not undo the exposure. If it was listable, assume it was copied.
Why this matters if you are a small team
Open buckets are rarely a decision. They are a side effect: a static site that needed public reads, a quick file share with a contractor, a Terraform module copied from a tutorial, a test bucket that became production. The .env figure is the telling one. Those files exist because a developer was moving fast, which describes most start-ups.
Three checks to run today
- Turn on S3 Block Public Access for the whole account. First, check whether anything relies on a public bucket, such as a static website or public downloads. If a website genuinely needs public files, serve them through CloudFront with origin access control rather than from a public bucket, and confirm the site still works. Then one command protects every bucket, including the ones created tomorrow:
aws s3control put-public-access-block --account-id <account-id> --public-access-block-configuration BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true. - Look for secrets in storage. Search your buckets for
.env,.pem,.tfstate,.sqland.bakfiles. Move Terraform state to a private, encrypted, versioned bucket with access logging. - Rotate anything that was ever public. Fixing the bucket is not enough. Any key, password or token that sat in a listable bucket should be treated as known to an attacker.
Where bearhug helps, and where it does not
bearhug surfaces the AWS Security Hub controls that catch this, including S3.1 (S3 general purpose buckets should have block public access settings enabled) and S3.8 (S3 general purpose buckets should block public access), and explains each one in plain English: which bucket, why it matters and how to fix it. For public buckets, one-click remediation applies the fix for you, with a rollback if a site breaks. New critical and high-severity findings arrive by email as AWS raises them, so a bucket opened on a Friday afternoon does not wait for the next audit.
bearhug does not read the contents of your files, so it will not tell you that a particular bucket holds a .env file. For that, use Amazon Macie or a secrets scanner in your CI pipeline. bearhug’s job is to stop the bucket being open in the first place, and to tell you quickly when one is.
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Sources: Ransomnews, Cloud Exposure Index 2026 (27 October 2026); Security Affairs, 29 October 2026; SC Media; AWS Security Hub CSPM controls for Amazon S3.